Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.
Nixon continued the phased drawdown of our combat troops on his timetable, not Congress’ recently proposed accelerated one-year withdrawal program. He ignored the anti-war riots, the background political noise, and intensified the air war to offset his Vietnamization Doctrine of fewer U.S. ground forces serving in combat roles. One of the most dramatic examples of the new strategy occurred in February, 1971 when Nixon upped the ante.
Our air force provided close air support (CAS) for a major ground operation in February, 1971 that would set off a firestorm. Nixon authorized CAS and artillery support for a massive ARVN invasion of Laos, a supposedly neutral country in French Indonesia. Noteworthy, no American combat ground troops were involved.
The operation would be a test of AVRN resolve and combat readiness following intensive American training. Nixon and his military advisors felt they had the momentum to press the military advantage after successfully eradicating VC/ NVR sanctuaries with the Cambodia invasion during the mid- ‘70’s. Buoyed by those positive results they hoped to duplicate a repeat performance in Laos. Prior to this major offensive, only limited clandestine missions were conducted in Laos by Special Forces and CIA paramilitary (SAD) allied with indigenous mountain tribes like the Montagnard’s.
Nixon was encouraged with the prospects. He hoped the February ‘71 ‘Operation Lan Son 719’ would eliminate North Vietnam Army (NVR) infiltration routes in Laos and interrupt logistic traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The supply trails weaving through thick jungles had been bombed many times before, hindering traffic, but never eliminating it despite defoliation of thick jungle cover. Deploying combat boots on the ground inside Laos intended to destroy supply routes from North Vietnam and disrupt VC safe havens once and for all. The ambitious offensive agenda included other aspirations and objectives as well.
Additional goals -This ARVN invasion would prove Nixon’s Vietnamization program was effective and boost ARVN morale. It would show the enemy that the South Vietnamese army did not need the U.S. combat troops to defeat them. It would send a message that the rules of engagement had changed; enemy sanctuaries would be eliminated anywhere. Maybe the action would shorten the war at the same time. High hopes.
But by now, winning the war was an illusion. Nixon wanted out with some semblance of honor preserving America’s image. Losing was unthinkable. No way would he allow defeat or be the first American President to lose a war. Sound familiar? Like JFK and LBJ he had a big ego and did not want that distinction on his legacy.
Nixon knew he would get criticism from the anti-war crowd for further expanding the war, but he was willing to take the flak if it would force North Vietnam to the negotiating table. The operation had definite upsides if the outcome was as successful as the attacks in Cambodia.
How did it work out?
Basically, the invasion turned out to be a disaster. No mincing the words. The ARVN suffered a 50% casualty rate. North Vietnamese intelligence anticipated the attack by the huge 22,000 ARVN combat force. The VC/ NVR were dug in, well prepared to defend their vital supply routes on their hostile terrain. The element of surprise enjoyed in Cambodia was absent, the enemy ready, locked and loaded. The defeat was demoralizing. Adding insult to injury, the Washington politicians paraded the notion the Vietnamization program was saving American lives, encouraging the media to publicize the spin, disseminate propaganda for public consumption.
Think about the psychological effect that spin evoked in South Vietnam. AVRN essentially was fighting to buy us time to withdraw. Optics matter. That perception did not go over well with the ARVN, the Saigon politicians, or the countryside. Counter-productive, it provoked anti-American sentiment.
The South Vietnamese in general weren’t committed to Nixon’s Vietnamization program or fighting an ideology like Communism for that matter. They were tired of war, period. Anti-American sentiment spread in South Vietnam. Open demands increased for General Thieu to secure a political compromise with the VC and the North. Get it over.
The Saigon government had refused to compromise in past negotiations with North Vietnam. Multiple efforts by America had failed to broker a peaceful settlement because both North and South were recalcitrant, unyielding in their political positions. The South Vietnam government under General Thieu began to face public opposition to the long war similar, but to a lesser degree, to the outcry of dissent exhibited by American citizenry.
On the home front, polls indicated a major shift in attitude along with a sense of urgency to get out of Vietnam by the end of the year, even if the abrupt withdrawal resulted in Communist control of South Vietnam. In other words, repudiate the Domino Theory. It took ten years to arrive at this standpoint, a complete 180 degree turn in sentiment rejecting Cold War dogma.
To quote Tuchman: “The public is volatile, polls are ephemeral, and the answers may respond to the language of the question.”
The war was controversial and unpopular, the national mood bitter, and the political polarization pronounced. But the anti-war objections reached another level- Even being in Vietnam became a moral issue debated widely. The reflections involved introspection of our motives in pursuing Cold War ideology. A lot of “what ifs” were involved in that contentious discussion.
Opinions started to evolve and coalesce that getting involved in the first place was a mistake and it was morally wrong to be fighting in Vietnam. The argument was supported by making the case it was unwise to “get involved in a foreign civil war; better to let them sort it out.”
The anger focused mainly on the governing leadership, not so much the military, although it soon spilled over into disrespect for returning VN Vet’s causing resentment that lasts to this day. The war was never the fighting man’s fault. Vietnam was a geopolitical failure not a military loss.
By 1972 the Vietnam war had lasted longer than any foreign conflict; over ten years starting with JFK sending in military “advisors” in 1961. The controversy over Vietnam cynically divided the country. The nation began to distrust its leaders, revolted and experienced episodic anarchy.
The six months Nixon allowed himself before accepting Vietnam as his war had stretched out to three years with no end was in sight. His Vietnamization program was faltering, the withdrawals were not quelling anti-war dissent, Paris Peace talks failing along with Kissinger’s back channel negotiations added up to a huge disappointment. The loss of an additional 15,000 troops KIA over that three-year time span, amounted to a disaster.
Could it get any worse?
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My blogs are intended as an educational overview, not an authoritative source. Vietnam subjects are controversial. Try to make some sense and understanding out of it, learn the lessons so as not to repeat them. (Santayana paraphrase)
History proves we are poor learners, but I still have hope…
My historical narrative, RECALL, goes into greater detail. I invite you to read it.
Comments invited if civil.
/Rlawson
In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVIII – More of the Same
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIX – Nixon’s Early Challenges
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XX – Vietnamization
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXI – Vietnamization Speech Reactions
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXII – Nixon’s Policy in Action
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXIII – Widening the War
The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XXIV – Upping the Ante
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXV – Nixon Landslide
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXVI- It’s Not Over Yet
[…] 1972, the war had lasted longer than any previous war. Kissinger’s secret negotiation missions and the Paris Peace Talks […]