The Nixon administration’s abrupt decision to radically change the rules of engagement in the Vietnam War was met with both positive and negative reactions at home and abroad.
From the military’s standpoint it had pluses and minuses. From North Vietnam’s viewpoint, it presented an opportunity. Would the Nixon doctrine alter the course of the conflict that had gone on for eight years since 1961? The jury was out.
The consensus opinion played to mixed reviews…
Good points:
- The enemy would be denied safe havens in Cambodia and Laos to recoup.
- Search and destroy missions no longer had LBJ’s self-imposed restrictions. Our troops were now authorized to pursue the enemy escaping across the fence.
- No more Viet Cong sanctuaries to regroup, resupply, and reload. The military celebrated that decision, long overdue.
Bad points:
- Unilateral withdrawal of combat troops seemed irrational and confused the military command.
- Nixon’s new strategy precluded winning the war in their view and was unlikely to make even a tentative settlement possible.
It did not take long for the Nixon Doctrine to become instituted. Nixon’s slogan, “Peace with honor,” heralded a program that began after three months in office. In April of 1969, the first of fourteen phased withdrawals of troops commenced. From a peak of 550,000 troops in ’68 during the Tet offensive, the final drawdown was completed in early 1973. This was a unilateral decision not involving negotiations with North Vietnam. Can you imagine the enemy’s reaction?
When the first contingent of 25,000 American troops sailed home in April, ‘69, North Vietnam sensed the conflict would eventually end in their favor if they just held out. As pointed out in a previous blog, Ho Chi Minh read the writing on the wall. The message incentivized North Vietnam to run out the clock.
In September, 1969, Ho Chi Minh died of congestive heart failure. He would not see the end result of his half century struggle. Six years later in 1975, Le Duc Tho, the NV General who took over, would celebrate Ho’s lifetime goal- occupation of South Vietnam.
Le Duc Tho shared Ho Chi Minh’s nationalistic commitment as expressed in Ho’s famous quote, ‘It was patriotism, not Communism, that inspired me.”
Le Duc Tho was not only a good general, but an accomplished diplomat, as Kissinger would soon discover. Le Duc Tho saw the big picture developing and would play it to his advantage.
As Tuchman pointed out in her documentary, “Reduction of effort does not signal to the enemy stern and determined intentions, but rather the reverse.” Le Duc Tho understood that the withdrawal signal was not a false flag. He read our intentions well and played the long game.
It is difficult to argue with Tuchman’s reasoning, but understand that Nixon inherited a mess. He sensed the nation on the verge of anarchy, forcing his decision. That set of circumstances complicated choosing the next step in conducting the war.
Basically, Nixon’s plan counted on a massive increase in the air war to offset the combat troop drawdown. His incoming administration devised this radical change of course under growing pressure, one that would prove controversial, but Nixon made the difficult choice – Decreasing the number of combat troops in Vietnam. The increase in bombing was not immediately noticed or divulged. Secret bombing forays of Cambodian sanctuaries commenced after two months in office. He sensed that troop drawdown was key to what the public wanted to get the war over and publicized that action.
Consider the chaotic milieu challenging Nixon at that time. It may foster a certain understanding of his situation and why he took that action. Trapped in an unimaginable state of affairs, he faced a no-win solution. Half the country would cheer him, the other half jeer. Not much empathy was accorded him in the midst of the ongoing chaos. The country’s mood was sour.
Recall that Nixon made his decision early in 1969 when the nation was coming apart at the seams on the home front, and the shock of our military losses of 4,000 in the ’68 Tet battles had jolted the public’s consciousness. The thought that Vietnam was becoming a quagmire without an end in sight began to sink in, unbearable to much of the nation and him.
Nixon tried to ameliorate both sides of the conflict, play both ends against the middle. He felt compelled to alter the course of the war by addressing the issues on both fronts, at home and abroad. It would become a delicate balance and the ultimate challenge. His administration had inherited a “losing horse”, most would agree, but few cut him any slack.
How would Nixon’s Doctrine work out? Let me count the ways it would and would not in my next blog.
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My blogs are intended to be educational. My historical narrative, RECALL, goes into comprehensive details not possible in blogs.
Comments welcome if civil.
/RLawson
In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVIII – More of the Same
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIX – Nixon’s Early Challenges
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XX – Vietnamization
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXI – Vietnamization Speech Reactions
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXII – Nixon’s Policy in Action
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXIII – Widening the War
The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XXIV – Upping the Ante
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXV – Nixon Landslide
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXVI- It’s Not Over Yet
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