Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.
“Vietnamization” – That was the title of Nixon’s nationally televised address delivered in hopes of settling the crescendo of public discord over Vietnam; a war dividing the country angrily into “Hawks” and “Doves.” That speech required maneuvering through a political minefield, a history of failed negotiations, pervading media hostility and anti-war bias, plus fake news.
The media bore considerable responsibility for polarizing the country, adding to Nixon’s challenge to calm things down. Media reports bordered on journalistic malpractice in some cases.
Difficult times demand difficult decisions. Nixon hoped to turn the antagonistic situation around with his “Vietnamization” speech. Give the country hope he’d soon get the war over, pledging to “bring our boys back home.” That was what they wanted to hear.
Much of the wartime reporting was filled with grim statistics, like listing the number of body bags, or tallies of planes shot down over North Vietnam, listing the pilots as MIA, KIA, or POW’s. Other accounts lacked battlefield factual reality, many were either exaggerated, misreported, or simply inaccurate to support an agenda. In other words, propaganda to support or reject the war effort. Repetitive negative news focusing on the morbid kept the public stirred up, compounded by the impact of photojournalism.
While some graphic photographs ignored the exculpatory backstory and unfairly laid the blame on our troops; other wire photos won Pulitzer prizes, becoming iconic. Some reached mythical status; symbolic posters for the anti-war crowd. Most of the public never knew the real backstory, just the headline or the photo. The negative inference influenced public opinion.
Media spin was common in the sixties under a different name, propaganda. LBJ liked to put the best face on the war news, dress it up. Shocking TV accounts bombarded the nation nightly with casualty reports emphasizing our superior kill ratio to the enemy’s, as if Secretary of Defense McNamara’s systemic analysis methodology really mattered to the average American, Joe six-pack, or stoned hippies “making love, not war.”
No one could escape that morbid flood of information. The gripping impact of the war soured the nation’s mood. To make matters worse, LBJ’s propaganda machine often disseminated disinformation. What was the real story on the Tonkin Gulf incident that gave JBJ carte blanche to conduct the war? Congress never declared the Vietnam war. Did you know that?
LBJ’s administration deluded not only the public, but Congress. Media coverage of the war was often short on the facts, long on opinion.
So, how in hell could the public really know what was actually was going on in Vietnam? Most had no clue. The media relied on the standard “fog of war” excuse when called out for misreporting or misrepresenting events or outright perpetuating a lie. I found a reference source that dispels many of the myths. I recommend it.
How could the public not be turned off, angry, or frustrated? Nixon hoped his address would bridge the divide and settle things down.
In the last year of LBJ’s Presidency, 1968, America evolved into a tinderbox of emotions, rocked by protests, riots, assassinations, and turmoil reaching a state of anarchy. That chaotic background on the home front combined with the deadly Tet battles abroad proved a flashpoint pivotal in the Vietnam War, a war we were winning militarily at great costs, but losing politically.
Nixon’s back was to the wall. Cornered, he sensed the urgency of taking the country in a new direction. America could not sustain the continual turmoil. He read the public’s sentiment and saw the paradox of the Domino Theory trapping him in a dilemma.
Ironically in 1968, American’s public opinion was the first domino to fall, not South Vietnam. I urge you to read this referenced blog and reflect on its message which carries a timeless meaning.
In fact, I consider that blog to encompass over fifty years of my personal reflections on Vietnam and the conclusions I’ve reached. I experienced both the Vietnam War and the cultural revolution aftermath in San Francisco upon my return up close and personal. That particular blog cited above represents my take on the epic saga.
There’s room for honest disagreement, but I’ve given the subject considerable thought and research, including reviewing declassified CIA intelligence estimates from that era. Outside the confirmation bias of my experience as an air evac officer/ flight surgeon in South Vietnam, I think I represent the Sixties era fairly objectively. Perhaps you will agree and let me know your thoughts.
Pause a moment to think about the complicated environment confronting Nixon, tasking him to find a solution to not one, but two ongoing conflicts. In essence, obligating him to come up with a reasonable resolution of the war in Vietnam while settling the cultural war at home featuring counter-culture hippies, unruly anti-war protesters, and riots. Clearly, America had reached the inflection point indicating it was time for a significant change or the nation would never recover.
No matter your political persuasion, you’d agree Nixon faced enormous adversity. Forced to make momentous decisions to change the war’s course to attain a favorable outcome as he promised voters. Pressured, he had to deliver now that his team was calling the shots. If he solved the primary war problem, he figured the other crisis on the home-front would subside.
That would not be an easy task. Shortly after taking office, Nixon recognized the dilemma and the pitfalls LBJ encountered. He discovered the untenable position LBJ had faced, some circumstances appearing insurmountable.
This forced Nixon to take a different direction, not be boxed in. His speech announced a dramatic change in policy and outlined plans he would pursue. After the speech, it became widely known as the Nixon Doctrine.
Under his Doctrine, the United States would offer military and economic aid to allies under Communist threat, but not commit combat boots on the ground. He put President Thieu and the Saigon military junta government on notice of his intentions. He announced a unilateral drawdown, “bringing the boys home,” the starting point to wind down and end the long war, as he had promised.
Without further negotiations, he would transition ground combat to the South Vietnamese ARVN. That proposal calmed things down a bit for a while, but raised serious concerns with our military command.
Withdrawal of combat troops is a usual way to win a war or force a favorable settlement. Our military was astounded to think Nixon’s ‘Vietnamization’ strategy would attain success. They had observed AVRN’s spotty performance since 1961, hallmarked by corruption, drugs, AWOL’s and inconsistent battlefield performance by some units.
Witnessing the general failure of the ‘MacVee’ training and advisory program they did not have high aspirations for the MACV/ part two plan. They’d been there and done MACV/ part one over the past eight years since 1961. The new agenda appeared to be just another MACV program on steroids. Many predicted no amount of increased American support would replace a will to fight for a cause to which the AVRN or the South Vietnamese populace were not fully committed. They would prove to be correct.
My next blog will pickup from there. Stand by for some dramatic revelations.
— —- —-
My blogs are intended to be an educational overview, not a comprehensive, authoritative source. More of a primer for those with little or no knowledge about the Vietnam War or its lasting impact on our political divisions a half a century later.
I go into greater detail in my historical narrative, RECALL. I urge you to read it for historical perspectives with parallels to recent wars in the Middle East.
Comments invited if civil.
— — —-
In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVIII – More of the Same
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIX – Nixon’s Early Challenges
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XX – Vietnamization
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXI – Vietnamization Speech Reactions
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXII – Nixon’s Policy in Action
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXIII – Widening the War
The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XXIV – Upping the Ante
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXV – Nixon Landslide
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXVI- It’s Not Over Yet
Leave a Reply