The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XIX- Nixon’s Early Challenges

Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.

To say Nixon inherited a mess would be a masterful understatement. He soon found he could not persuade the enemy come to acceptable terms either, encountering LBJ’s dilemma. Kissinger’s and other envoys’ intense negotiations failed.  Ho Chi Minh died in September, 1969, but his government maintained his recalcitrant policy and goal with tenacity and devotion. North Vietnam resigned not to budge and decided to run out the clock. Noting the anti-war furor in the States convinced them we would lose our will.

So, Nixon would eventually resort to military coercion just like his predecessor, prolonging the war and domestic unrest. Not just more of the same, but much more. He would eventually release the “Dogs of War.” More about that later…

First, let me retrace the background, the early days of the Nixon Presidency, his plans, and course of action.

On the third of November, 1969, Nixon gave his famous “Vietnamization” speech outlining his plan. Basically, his intention was to quell domestic protests. Assure the public that conditions would improve. The plan would return the combat war effort to South Vietnam’s AVRN with floods of military supplies, aid, and training. Sound familiar?

In other words, reverting back to block A and JFK.  After all, it was “their war.” Additionally, Nixon’s plan would reverse LBJ’s course by ending the draft and decreasing our combat forces- “Bringing home our boys.” That action would resonate with the public and calm things down for a while.

Unannounced, behind the scenes, the air war would be intensified to compensate for unilateral troop withdrawals. The plan would not involve negotiations, but signal to Hanoi that we were serious in seeking a diplomatic settlement.

Nixon’s plan changed other LBJ policies. He authorized attacks on enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, no longer off-limits. North Vietnam supply lines would be heavily targeted, especially the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. The military cheered this change that deprived the enemy of safe havens to escape, resupply and reload ‘across the fence.’

Nixon hoped to appease American’s strife with this plan.  But, if North Vietnam did not come to reasonable negotiating terms, a punitive level of bombing North Vietnam plus a blockade and mining of Haiphong harbors were on the drawing board.

The first secret bombing of Cambodia occurred in March 1969, two months into office, another in May, and then the air raids became regular in May to emphasize to Hanoi the seriousness of the new strategy. Although Nixon had hoped to keep his promise to end the war early on by shifting the combat role to AVRN, his Presidency soon became subject to the same fear and affliction as LBJ and JFK- “Being the first President to lose a war.’ Like his predecessors, failure was not an option. He increased the stakes.

Nixon’s adamant mindset convinced him that a different strategy with additional force would bring the enemy to terms- surrender or negotiations. It did not take him more than six months to reach that state of mind. The war was now his to win or lose. Sound familiar?

In her historical documentary Tuchman suggested there should have been a sign on the White House and National Security Council’s wall reading: “DO NOT REPEAT WHAT HAS ALREADY FAILED.”

She nailed it in my opinion. I urge you to read her documentary.

Our government seems to have a great capacity of not learning the lessons of history, consequently continuing to make the same mistakes. Did anyone in D.C. ever read Santayana’s “The Life of Reason”?

By that ‘warning sign’ suggestions Tuchman referred to – Examining the reasons for the French defeat at Dien Bin Phu in 1954. Acknowledging Ho Chi Minh’s stake and his will and capacity to fight for it. Understanding the necessity to reappraise the reasons why LBJ’s negotiation efforts failed.

Tuchman states “… to continue a war for the sake of a free-standing regime in South Vietnam was both vain and non-essential to American security…  to negotiate for a result the enemy would not cede was a waste of time…

She cites Reischauer, “… even unlimited force to attain the desired result would contain no guarantee that political rule over South Vietnam ten or twenty years later would be any different had we never became involved over there.”

Tuchman took the pacifist hardline. In retrospect, she presented strong arguments for withdrawal at that time Nixon took office. Tuchman suggested the logical course might have been- “Cut our losses, let the South Vietnamese decide their fate- Communist or Democratic, and withdraw on a one-condition agreement to phase out of our forces with a POW agreement.”

That proposal comes under the category of “What ifs.” In 1969 the Rand study presented those considerations to Kissinger. They had a certain appeal, but never happened. Hindsight is 20/20.

At that tim,e her suggestions would not fly. Less than half of America would have gone along with that proposed program if given the choice. Our self-image was ‘Americans win wars.’ Although the nation was polarized, the divisions deepening, the country coming apart at the seams, patriotism and support of our military were solemn oaths shared by most Americans.

Nixon was already in LBJ’s bind, facing an untenable position. Any action he took would upset about half of the nation. A philosophical conflict raged between Hawks and Doves regarding Vietnam. Should we “cut and run”? Negotiations had reached another dead end despite Kissinger’s efforts. Pressure to produce positive results as his campaign had promised compounded Nixon’s challenge.

The Rand Corporation had presented the options Tuchman cited above to Kissinger and his military advisors, but were rejected. The Cold War psyche once again prevailed. It was an obsessive dictum at that time. Questioning it tantamount to political heresy. However, by 1969 the Vietnam War was not so much about the security of the United States, or the Communist threat in SE Asia, but about America’s image, its prestige and reputation. That positive image must be preserved at all costs.

Nixon listened to all options, but was not about to withdraw from South Vietnam despite the pressure. Confident his plan would preserve America’s image, and win the war, or at least not lose it, he instituted his plan.

But the costs to preserve America’s image would be high in terms of those KIA.  Not half, as some of the media later alleged, but 36 % (21,000) of our total Vietnam War mortality (58,220), would occur during the Nixon Presidency, 1969 to ’74, as he prolonged and escalated the war.

In summary, Under Nixon, the Vietnam War became more than “more of the same.” He outlined his plan in a December, 1969 TV speech to the nation called “Vietnamization” to defuse the anti-war protests and settle the domestic chaos. But, like his predecessors, JFK and LBJ, Nixon declined to accept defeat and would release “The Dogs of War.” That change in strategy made several essential points that I will discuss along with Nixon’s plan in the next blog.

NOTE: Fact checking Vietnam statistics, I found disparities on the Google and Bing search sites, but the stats cited above appear accurate. My research of other related Vietnam subjects discovered other inconsistencies in reporting accurate numbers. I finally found an authoritative, referenced site that corrected inaccurate reports and stats, dispelling many misconceptions and myths. Don’t get sucked into revisionist history and propaganda. Get the facts.

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This series of blogs is intended to be a primer, an overview, for those unfamiliar with a controversial war occurring over fifty years ago when our population numbered about 190 million. Our current population is 330 million, so about half have no idea about the Vietnam War. Many others have no recall. Vietnam’s history and aftermath offer valuable lessons relevant to present day considerations – The pretext for becoming involved in war, the strategy for conducting the war, and defining the endpoint for the war- Victory- in terms the common man in the streets understands.

I hope you read the entire series of blogs and my historical narrative, RECALL, published last year. My 52 reviews are averaging 4.6 out of 5 Amazon stars, many submitted by Vets of that era.

Comments are welcomed if civil, and especially if educational like many contributions have been so far.

/RLawson