Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.
When the media exposed that Nixon had secretly extended the war effort into Cambodia, authorizing our combat troops to eradicate enemy sanctuaries, lawless outrage erupted in the U.S. The anti-war activism gained momentum in reaction to an invasion of a supposedly neutral country in Indochina. The public uproar, fanned by mostly negative press, accused Nixon of expanding the war instead of winding it down as he promised.
Some polls, however, showed wide surges of support for Nixon’s more aggressive strategy. Why allow the enemy a safe haven ‘across the fence’ to regroup? A strong argument was made by Hawks.
The military cheered the action as long overdue. They had been fighting ten years with self-imposed restrictions based on rules of engagement dictated by the administration in DC, not the Pentagon. That policy allowed the enemy to retreat across South Vietnam borders to recover and reload in Cambodia and Laos. It never made sense to them, no way to fight a war.
The prior administrations’ “limited war” strategy was a pointless impediment to achieving a definitive victory. A hurdle leading to a costly war of attrition. Finally, our military search and destroy missions would yield more positive results. Guerilla warfare had been perfected by the VC. Allowing them to regroup in sanctuaries behind ill-defined South Vietnam borders made no sense to Nixon either. He widened the war in order to bring it to a timely conclusion. Would he succeed?
The early military victories were encouraging. The Viet Cong were depleted from the costly casualty incurred during the Tet battles. They were vulnerable. Nixon’s policy pressed the advantage. The Cambodia attacks not only surprised the VC, but deprived them of a chance to recover. The early Cambodian missions’ success prompted hawks to wonder why this action was not taken earlier in the war? Why fight with one hand tied behind your back for years? Good question…
Actions and flawed policies have consequences, some unintended and unexpected. The Vietnam War was a case study throughout three Presidencies – JFK, LBJ, and Nixon.
By a wide margin LBJ bore the brunt of misguided policies by imposing rules of engagement allowing the enemy safe havens from the get-go. Wars of attrition do not end well. Hindsight is 20/20- Self-imposed restrictions should never have adapted.
One unintended consequence was the unending domestic chaos sparked by widening the war into Cambodia. That reaction created a siege mentality in the White House. They had expected the phased troop withdrawals and ending the draft to quiet down the anti-war activism. That policy did settle things down for a while, but the respite was short-lived. Why?
The White House’s major concern was the leaks of secret missions. The military forays into Cambodia were classified, but leaked to the press who stirred up the trouble. How did that happen?
Conspiracy theories pervaded the Nixon administration, especially after the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg in June, 1971. Although the publication of McNamara’s classified documents did not go beyond the 1968 LBJ presidency or in any manner involve or implicate Nixon, it raised White House alarms regarding unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information. Suspicious of the press and wary of Democratic operatives, they tightened White House and State Department security to prevent further leaks of classified information. They had some important irons in the fire they did not want to get out.
Nixon and Kissinger were working secretly on a summit meeting in Moscow plus reopening diplomatic relations with China. The geopolitical stakes were high, but looking promising. They could not afford to have those two sensitive negotiations exposed by leaks potentially impeding the successful progress they were making. That prompted increased proactive security measures, some ill-advised.
The White House palace guard perceived a left-wing revolution facilitated by the Democrats a distinct possibility. Figuring two can play the dirty tricks game, the administration overreacted by taking preemptive action. Prior to Nixon’s election in ‘68 the CIA wiretapped him. His paranoia was not without foundation.
The White House resorted to surveillance of those on the “enemy list.” Under Charles Colson, they set up undercover operations including wiretapping, spying, and break-ends. The “plumbers”, Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt, ultimately would be Nixon’s undoing. “Dirty tricks” were nothing new. Prior to his election, Nixon was accused of undermining the Paris Peace talks by the Democrats. More about that illegal activity later.
As another consequence, the expanded military action into Cambodia deepened the political divide between Hawks and Doves, further polarizing the political spectrum. Protests in the streets took on a mob atmosphere when anti-war marchers rioted and threw eggs at Nixon at a San Jose, California mid-term political rally.
Some of the worst riots occurred after sensational media revelations of major events like the National Guard shootings of four Kent State students protesting on campus in 1970, and the exposure of the My Lai massacre, an atrocity covered up and the news suppressed for over a year. Massive anti-war protests flared out of control. Nixon had his hands full dealing with a full plate of problems at home and abroad.
Until Cambodia, the silent majority supported Nixon, but now weary of the long war he promised to end. The President had unexpectedly expanded the conflict, disappointing them. Political fracture lines began to show after Nixon’s first six months resulted in no cease fire, as he’d promised. The public started to fear more of the same. In fact, it would be, but with some surprising turns of events, some very positive results would unfold over the next two years.
On another contentious front, Congress had been effectively sidelined during LBJ’s prosecution of the Vietnam War, but now became vocal. Under the Tonkin Bay Resolution Congress never declared war, it was conducted as an executive war under LBJ and JFK. And, it included Nixon’s authority up until now. Anti-war Democrats, like Mansfield and Kennedy, publicly denounced support. They stated they wanted the war over within a year by withdrawing all of our troops.
Polls tended to support their viewpoints even if it meant loss of South Vietnam to Communist control. That was a big change in sentiment which Nixon ignored, sticking to his Vietnamization plan.
The political debates became animated, sometimes heated. Since the Republicans held the majority in Congress and chaired the key committees, they defeated the anti-war measures. That allowed Nixon to pursue his Vietnamization timeline of fourteen phased withdrawals.
But political wrangling continued over whether the President had authority to conduct an undeclared war. That presented a sticky wicket. The unresolved legal Constitutional challenge ended up in the Supreme Court. The judges wiggled out of making a declarative decision to the question- Does the President, as Commander-In-Chief, have Constitutional War powers if Congress never declared a war? Ponder that one for a while…
Congress did manage to get the Tonkin Bay Resolution repealed with the Nixon Administration’s support on 14 January, 1971, seven years after it gave LBJ carte blanche to conduct the war. Bills to cut off funding the war were introduced by Democrats, but failed to gain enough support to pass. But the change in Congressional mood was not lost on Nixon.
Nevertheless, Nixon stuck to his Vietnamization plans. In 1971, ARVN forces with American close air support invaded Laos. The Vietnam War had widened from Cambodia to include Laos. Now all three of the original French colonies of Indonesia were involved in a conflict Nixon pledged to end. How would that work out?
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I hope you are following my overview of the Vietnam War with heavy attribution to historian, Barbara Tuchman. She understood the convoluted conflict better than most of the forty plus accounts I researched to publish my historical narrative RECALL. I studied CIA Intelligence Estimates from that era, declassified in the early 1980’s, that corroborate most of her observations and mine regarding that controversial war. The CIA got it right more often than not. They’d been involved in covert operations in SE Asia since the Chiang Kai-Shek/ Mao Zedong civil war era between Nationalists and Communists, 1946/ ’48. Too bad much of the CIA advice on Vietnam was ignored. But that’s another story.
These blogs are not the final word, but pretty close to the truth about Vietnam, if it ever be known. I hope you take time to read my novel that is more comprehensive than my blogs, especially with CIA references. I guarantee you will learn a lot. If you have more time, I recommend Tuchman’s documentary.
Comments welcome if civil. The subject of Vietnam tends to push some buttons.
/RLawson
In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVIII – More of the Same
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIX – Nixon’s Early Challenges
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XX – Vietnamization
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXI – Vietnamization Speech Reactions
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXII – Nixon’s Policy in Action
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXIII – Widening the War
The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XXIV – Upping the Ante
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXV – Nixon Landslide
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXVI- It’s Not Over Yet
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