Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.
They don’t play beanball in Washington, D.C. Politics is a blood sport.
LBJ was a political animal who recognized reality- Vietnam was a dead end for him, the war dividing the Nation, losing popular support, and threatening the demise of the Democratic party. Losing a reelection in November 1968 would be the ultimate humiliation. So, LBJ abdicated.
Three days later, Hanoi signaled it was willing to talk… with preconditions. More of the same.
Nixon won the 1968 Presidential election over Humphrey with margins greater than a million in both the popular and electoral votes. Independent candidate, George Wallace, carried five deep Southern States or the margin of victory would have resulted in a landslide. Nixon ran on “Law and Order” and a “New Approach to Vietnam War.”
America was sick and tied of the chaos at home, increasing military fatalities abroad, the call-up of reserves and the draft. Nixon promised to get the country out of what was becoming commonly referred to as a “quagmire” with no end in sight. However, it would take five more years to disengage with some semblance of preserving America’s prestige and honor.
Noted historian, Barbara Tuchman puts LBJ’s failures into perspective: “Withdrawal of public support proved the undoing of an Executive [branch] that believed it could conduct a limited war without engaging the national will of a democracy.”
To that observation which she considered a folly, I would add- We did not know our enemy, the basic fundamental of war (Sun Tzu-The Art of War). We underestimated Ho Chi Minh and failed to respect North Vietnam’s resolute will to fight to the last man.
More, importantly, we failed to win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese, or gain their commitment to Democracy by recognizing and fighting the Communist threat. I agree with JFK’s early analysis in 1962: “It’s their war to win or lose… It requires their will… No amount of American support can substitute for that commitment.”
South Vietnamese, in general, did not buy into “The Domino Theory”, while we did. Diem’s unpopular government was propped up by Eisenhower, Truman, and the CIA over a decade before JFK’s direct involvement by committing “military advisors” in 1961. Diem was destined to fail as Buddhist immolations and civil unrest increased. His coup in ’63 came as no surprise. The CIA’s complicity did.
Democrats complained Nixon won the 1968 election by torpedoing the Paris and backchannel peace negotiations LBJ had underway. They alleged Nixon promised the Saigon government he would win the peace for them if elected. In other words, wait, don’t cut any deals yet…
That “dirty pool” accusation raged on for decades reaching mythical status. I suggest you read the link above. I guarantee you will find it enlightening and bring to mind current political opposition tactics including surveillance controversies and other dirty tricks. Some things never change.
Like I said in my opening paragraph, politics is a blood sport for hardball players.
To say Nixon inherited a mess would be an understatement. But he soon found he could not make the enemy come to acceptable terms either, encountering LBJ’s dilemma. So, he resorted to military coercion like his predecessor, prolonging the war and domestic unrest. Not just more of the same, but much more. Nixon reneged on his promise, subject to the same fear and trap as LBJ- “Being the first President to lose a war.’ Failure was not an option. He increased the stakes.
This rigid mindset convinced him that a different strategy with additional force would bring the enemy to terms- surrender or negotiations. It did not take long to reach that state of mind.
Tuchman’s documentary suggests there should have been a sign on the White House and National Security Council’s wall reading: “Do not repeat what has already failed.” She nailed it in my opinion. Our government seems to have a great capacity of not learning the lessons of history, consequently continuing to make the same mistakes.
By that she referred to- The French defeat at Dien Bin Phu in 1954; Ho Chi Minh’s stake and his will and capacity to fight for it; a reappraisal of reasons why LBJ’s negation efforts failed. Tuchman states: “… to continue a war for the sake of a free-standing regime in South Vietnam was both vain and non-essential to American security… to negotiate for a result the enemy would not cede was a waste of time…”
Citing Reischauer, “… even unlimited force to attain the desired result would contain no guarantee that political rule over South Vietnam ten or twenty years later would be any different had we never became involved over there.” (Tuchman)
In retrospect, these are strong arguments for withdrawal at that time. Tuchman suggests the logical course might have been- Cut our losses, let the South Vietnamese decide their fate- Communist or Democratic, and withdraw on a one-condition agreement to phase out of our forces with a POW agreement.
At that time, perhaps only half of America would have gone along with that program. The Nation was polarized, the divisions deepening, coming apart at the seams. Nixon was already in LBJ’s bind, an untenable position. Any action he took would upset half the nation.
The Rand Corporation presented those options to Kissinger and his military advisors, but the Cold War psyche prevailed. The Vietnam War was no longer about the security of the United States, or the Communist threat in SE Asia, but about America’s image, its prestige and reputation. It must be preserved at all costs.
And the costs would be high. Almost 28% of our total 58 thousand Vietnam War casualties, 21 thousand, occurred during the Nixon Presidency, 1969 to 1974 as he prolonged and escalated the war.
Nixon declined to accept defeat and released “The Dogs of War.” More about that in the next blog.
This series of blogs is intended to be a primer, an overview, for those unfamiliar with a controversial war occurring over fifty years ago when our population numbered about 190 million. Our current population is 330 million, so about half have no idea about the Vietnam War. Many others have no recall. It’s history and aftermath offer valuable lessons.
I hope you read the entire series of blogs and my historical narrative, RECALL. My reviews are averaging 4.6 out of 5 Amazon stars, many by Vets.
Comments are welcomed if civil, and especially if educational like many contributions have been.
/RLawson
In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan|
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In
Charles Moorman says
I seem to recall that a government official, his name escapes me at the moment, stated that the “peace with honor” deal worked out with the North Vietnamese in 1973 wasn’t much different than what Nixon could have gotten in 1969. And for that 21,000 more U.S. soldiers died as well as countless ARVN, NVA and Viet Cong troops. Certainly a pyrrhic victory if there ever was one!
R Lawson says
Charles- That’s a reasonably accurate account of history in retrospect, but it is very complicated as I will explain in subsequent blogs. Stand by..
Toby Decker says
You are correct. Actually the 1973 deal was essentially the same as that proposed in Oct, 1968, during the Presidential election. We now have released audio recordings and records of Nixon encouraging Claire Chennault to tell Pres. Thieu to ignore the Paris Peace talks. These are not allegations but fact supported by the recordings, which anyone can listen to. With Peace Talks looming, Humphrey began to close the gap with Nixon. Fearing he would lose, Nixon needed to sabotage their talks fast.
Nixon surreptitiously referred to a secret plan to end the war. His mendacity meant there was no plan as he and Kissinger, despite saying they would do things different, continued making the same strategic mistakes of LBJ’s generals. Sadly, Nixon lied more than LBJ with secret, illegal bombing of Cambodia, and Laos. In 1966, the CIA confirmed that bombing North Vietnam had no impact on the increasing flow of men, and materials south along the HCM trail.