Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.
The devastating Christmas bombing succeeded in bringing North Vietnam to the negotiating table for a serious discussion this time, no more games. The relentless ‘Dogs of War” bombardment convinced Hanoi to settle. Nixon’s last-ditch gambit focused their attention on coming to terms. He took the risk of collective condemnation at home and abroad for the reward of finally ending the war.
North Vietnam quickly reached a deal in earnest on the condition that the U.S. agreed to halt the brutal assault. In fact, the overwhelming force of the destruction convinced Le Duc Tho to reach a reasonable settlement within a month, signing the Paris Treaty on January 27, 1973. Decades later he admitted NV would have surrendered if the massive bombing had continued much longer. Think about that admission a moment.
The circumstances of settlement were filled with irony. Both North and South Vietnam relented on long-standing sticking points that had blocked resolution of the conflict time after time. Primarily, they both conceded the two conditions that had prolonged the war almost four years- NV demanding the overthrow of Thieu’s regime in Saigon, and Thieu’s demand that NV withdraw all NVR forces from the South.
Other agreed upon features- The Viet Cong became the PRG and was recognized politically. The DMZ was retained as a provisional, not a territorial barrier, same as in the Geneva agreement fifteen years prior to this treaty.
Most importantly our POW’s would soon be returned.
“Thieu gripped refusal with the rigor of death until the last hour of Nixon’s ultimatum before signing the treaty.” Nixon’s ultimatum swayed him finally.
As a final irony, the viability of a non-Communist South Vietnam, the pretext for becoming involved in the first place hung in the lurch, about to be abandoned. After twelve years of war that devastated Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) it was essentially over as far as American combat was concerned.
In the aftermath, a series of events evolved that wrapped up the war’s final stages. North Vietnam eventually pursued its goal and invaded the South a final time. Two years later the NVR tanks roared into Saigon on April 30, 1975.
The war finally ended with the South’s surrender. The AVRN fought hard, but were outmatched. The few remaining U.S. personnel, diplomats, CIA, and military were evacuated by helicopters from rooftops at the last minute. As many Vietnamese who possibly could, jumped aboard, while other thousands fled by boat armadas.
The Communists took thirty years, but they now controlled Vietnam and Cambodia. Atrocities followed the brutal conquest, but that’s another story, not a pretty one.
Before Saigon’s downfall, Nixon had pledged additional funding and support to Saigon, but a Democratic controlled Congress later cut off Nixon’s $1.45 billion-dollar funding request.
In early 1973, Nixon ended the draft and had POW’s returned, but by late 1973 the Watergate scandal was brewing, overshadowing his accomplishments. The political burglary became his nemesis, the coverup his down fall a year later in 1974.
So, what did we learn from Vietnam? That raises a lot of questions…
Nixon’s legacy, like his predecessors’, JFK and LBJ played to mixed reviews along political lines polarized by the Vietnam War. America never completely healed. It is my contention the acrimony birthed by Vietnam and the cultural revolution persists over five decades later.
V.P. Gerald Ford finished out the final two and half years of the office tarnished by the scandal and the aftermath of Vietnam. The public was disillusioned with Washington politics. Ford was a decent, honest man, but Congress blocked him every chance they had after he pardoned Nixon.
Concluding Nixon’s term, Ford ran, but lost the next Presidential election to Jimmy Carter in November 1976. In a candidate debate with Carter prior to the election, he forgot the Soviets had two tank divisions in Poland, an awkward omission. The gaffe cost him dearly.
Carter took office in January 1977 and served until 1981 when he lost to Reagan. Carter issued pardons to Vietnam draft dodgers in one of his first acts as President causing some consternation. But Carter is best remembered for the Iran hostage crisis in 1979 and the botched helicopter rescue plan in the desert. He never lived that fiasco down. He retired to his peanut farm in Georgia to criticize successive Presidents.
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So, what did we learn from our Vietnam experience? Basically, that it raised more questions than offered answers…
What did we have to show for spending over $20 billion a year over a huge budget for a decade? Or, more importantly, our casualty expenditure – The loss of 58,220 killed, plus over 300,000 WIA?
The official Vietnamese casualty estimate released in 1995 by Vietnam was enormous:
- Two million civilians North and South
- 1.1million NVR and VC combined (North and South)
- 313,000 ARVN (South)
All to fight an ideology – Communism? Was Vietnam an existential threat? Essential to our national security? Was the pretext for involvement flawed?
Did the Cold War mindset lure us into a war we could win military, but lose politically through poor leadership, poor decisions, and flawed strategies?
Ask yourself, was it worth it? That’s a lot of carnage to account for little gain.
Did McNamara’s 10 to 1 kill ratio stat make you feel any better?
Did the Vietnam experience contribute to loss of faith in our government?
Tuchman ascribes Vietnam a folly, a product of ‘cognitive dissonance’ – a deselection of facts contraindicating our involvement. JFK ignored CIA and military intelligence warning not to get into a war in Asia. Our military cautioned it could be another disheartening Korean experience. How did Vietnam constitute an existential threat to American security?
Cogent points. I agree with her and would add other follies.
LBJ pursued a limited war of attrition with serious self-imposed rules of engagement precluding victory, prolonging the war with its resultant casualties. LBJ never understood the fundamental of war – Know your enemy. He fought the war ‘not to lose it.’
Other considerations – Nixon finally disengaged from ‘nation building’ and gave General Thieu an ultimatum to sign the Paris Treaty. By the way, when did ‘nation building’ last work out? South Korea? WWII? Iraq? Afghanistan?
Some historians argue the war, based on the Domino Theory, bought enough time for significant geopolitical changes (détente with Russia and China) to alter the Cold War calculus. Also, the British prevailed in Malaysia. Consequently, SE Asia did not fall, as predicted in the Domino Theory, to Communism while Vietnam and Cambodia did succumb under harsh Communist rule and conditions. Others argue that outcome would have happened anyway if we never became involved. Moot points…
Another consideration- Maybe the U.S. should have accepted Ho Ch Minh’s offer reunite North and South after Dien Bin Phu. His brand of Communism and innate Nationalism could have served as a buffer to Mao and China’s brand of Communism. Not all brands are the same. The Soviets offered a third version of Communism. Again, hindsight is 20/20.
Along that lie of thought, in retrospect, I wonder, what if JFK or LBJ had unleashed Nixon’s “Dogs of War” strategy earlier? Would it have ended the conflict sooner? Saved thousands of lives? Theirs and ours?
I’ve thought about that for many years along with other “what ifs?”
Other retrospectives… What if we had pressed our military advantage after the 1968 Tet depleted the enemy force? The VC regular units were crippled, the NVR decimated following the year-long battles. The enemy’s estimated casualty toll numbered as many KIA in a year as we suffered in ten years – around 58,000.
The NVR and VC were nursing their wounded and seriously weakened. Vulnerable to a North Vietnam invasion to end the war. Why not? Our military was ready and able. Yet, ironically, ’68 turned out to be a turning point in the war.
What if the Christmas bombing had not been suspended to attain the Paris Treaty? Would North Vietnam have surrendered? Could we then have declared a definitive victory? As it turned out Vietnam was a political loss despite our military gains.
That’s a lot of “What ifs” to think about, but we should take the time.
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The Vietnam War left a psychic scar on America, much like a national PTSD. Much of the polarized political division we now witness was birthed over fifty years ago. Many of the far-left progressives are third and fourth generation progeny of the cultural revolution and the anti-war activists. Many of the far right are off-spring of patriots, hawks, and veterans of the VN era who were treated disrespectfully upon their return to the States.
Wars are difficult to understand. Why do we continue to become involved if it is not a real threat to national security? There were no WMD’s in Iraq. The CIA and allied intel agencies got it wrong. We’ve been in Afghanistan twenty years involved in tribal wars that have been going on forever. We nailed OBL over in Pakistan, time to get out.
We’re dealing with AQ and ISIS without overwhelming Middle East support. Why aren’t local nations primarily involved, taking the lead? Should we be the world’s policeman?
I air evacuated wounded in Vietnam and experienced the cultural revolution first-hand in San Francisco upon my return. I wrote a book about it. If you read RECALL, you will understand why I have strong sentiments regarding war.
We should heed Santayana’s admonition from the Voice of Reason-
“Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
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In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVIII – More of the Same
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIX – Nixon’s Early Challenges
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XX – Vietnamization
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXI – Vietnamization Speech Reactions
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXII – Nixon’s Policy in Action
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXIII – Widening the War
The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XXIV – Upping the Ante
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXV – Nixon Landslide
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXVI- It’s Not Over Yet
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