Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.
Just when you thought the Vietnam war was winding down following Nixon’s landslide reelection in November 1972, it was just getting started in regards to the magnitude and extent of the targeted bombing. Nixon released the ‘Dogs of War’ after exhaustive attempts for a settlement with North Vietnam failed. Here’s the background.
By 1972, the war had lasted longer than any previous war. Kissinger’s secret negotiation missions and the Paris Peace Talks continued to falter. The U.S. was trying to find middle ground to negotiate out of a war they could not win and look good at the same time. Searching for a way to preserve Nixon’s “peace with honor” and America’s image presented a daunting task.
Hanoi recognized America’s compromising mindset and dug in. Vietnam was their land and their future. The stakes were not equal. By March, most of the U.S. combat force had departed. North Vietnam took advantage of this unexpected good fortune and staged a massive 120,000 NVR offensive. Soviet tanks stormed across the DMZ and advanced towards Saigon. By launching the huge offensive force, 40,000 greater than deployed in the ’68 Tet offensive, Hanoi intended to end the war definitively by delivering the fatal blow to a vulnerable foe. They planned to defeat an AVRN demoralized by phased drawdowns of American combat troops who always had their backs. AVRN had to go it alone in ground combat against a superior force in numbers. They barely held their own even with American air support.
Without sufficient combat ground forces in South Vietnam to fight the onslaught, the U.S. resorted to massive air power. MACV activated stage one of the heavy bombardment plan that had been dormant on the military’s drawing board since 1969, three years earlier. It was time.
Designed to counter balance the NV invasion and severely punish the enemy, B-52s hit Hanoi and Haiphong fuel deposits and transportation hubs, demolishing targets previously off-limits. In addition, Nixon ignored the danger of potential damage to Soviet and foreign shipping and authorized stage two of the ‘Dogs of War’- blockade and mining of Haiphong harbor. Nixon felt confident that this combined action would eventually bring North Vietnam to the table to settle the war on his terms. How much could they take?
Nixon weathered the expected censure from the media and Democrats. Meanwhile, somewhat surprisingly, the general public was not outraged. Rather, they applauded the tough response and viewed the action long overdue. They understood Hanoi’s repetitive refusals to negotiate in good faith blocked a settlement of a war that had gone on way too long. The general public hoped this heavy bombing campaign would finally convince the North to comply and compromise to get the war over. They backed Nixon’s strong reaction to North Vietnam’s invasion of the South stemming much of the anti-war protest psychology.
The ‘Dogs of War’ strategy was designed to force Hanoi to the table. If that did not happen, the administration hoped the heavy bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam would at least weaken them allowing Saigon to survive long enough for the U.S. to get out of Vietnam.
South Vietnam’s president, General Thieu was informed and given an ultimatum. The U.S. offered a last-ditch chance to relent on his restrictive conditions and grant concessions to NV negotiators to settle the war. The U.S. even offered him asylum outside the country in the Philippines if he feared reprisals. Still no deal.
Nixon could now use Thieu’s ultimate refusal to negotiate as an excuse to make a deal on his own for POW’s and leave South Vietnam to its own fate. Thieu had blown his last chance.
Unfortunately, this early stage of the targeted bombing mission did not achieve its basic goal quick enough. North Vietnam still refused to negotiate. Hanoi remained as obstinate as General Thieu in Saigon. Both sides refused to budge – A big mistake on their respective parts.
Nixon went to the closing moments of the fierce air war, activating stage-two of the ’69 drawing board plan. Nixon would authorize the USAF and Navy to launch a historic air raid – one that no one would ever forget in SE Asia. One demonstrating America’s overwhelming power.
After Nixon’s reelection, he no longer seemed concerned with public protests. He focused on just ending the war, one way or another, sooner rather than later. Nixon responded to North Vietnam’s unrelenting intransigence and invasion of South Vietnam with the famous, or infamous, “Christmas bombing, ” which was actually a turning point ending the war. The ‘Dogs of War’ finale would eclipse all the prior bombing campaigns in its severity and intensity.
In December, Operation Linebacker II commenced. The joint operation of the 7th Air Force and U.S. Navy Task Force 777 authorized and organized B-52 squadrons to carpet bomb Hanoi and Haiphong to rubble. No holds barred. Collateral damage assumed. The missions flew around the clock, wave after wave over ten days starting December 18,1972, taking only Christmas day off.
The Air Force pounded North Vietnam with over 20,000 tons of bombs, more than the total tonnage of the last three years of war. The mission used 129 big bombers. The B-52s flew in waves, three at a time in succession. They destroyed Hanoi’s airport, MiG airfields, power plants and factories. Residential and civilian property became collateral damage. The ‘Dogs of War’ strategy spared little, even civilian life as their property suffered. The carpet bombing left a brutal image… A scorched earth punishment. The scale and ferocity were reminiscent of Dresden, Germany’s demolishment in WWII. Hanoi and Haiphong lay in ruin after ten days.
The B-52s flying out of Guam and Thailand were escorted by fighter/ bomber planes off of aircraft carriers in Yankee Station in the South China Sea, and from Air Force bases in Thailand. The SEAD mission was target suppression, i.e. to destroy enemy air defenses. That was a formidable task. The air defenses in North Vietnam consisted of modern antiaircraft guns, Fan Song tracking radar, Soviet SAM missiles and Soviet Mig-21 fighter planes. And, their operators were good at targeting our planes.
The concentrated and skilled NV defenses took a significant toll on our aircraft and crews. The U.S. lost between 24 and 27 B-52s and twelve to fifteen SEAD fighter jets. The actual number is unaccounted for because if a damaged plane made it back to base, it did not count as a loss even if it never flew again. It is estimated we lost 15 SEAD aircraft and crews. The stats are not solid.
The Linebacker II casualty report was estimated at 15 KIA, 30 MIA, and 95 to 100 POWs. Again “accurate” figures vary. Nothing new if you have ever researched Vietnam stats.
The purpose of Linebacker II was to weaken NV sufficiently to permit Saigon’s government to survive for a while longer if NV refused to be forced into earnest negotiations. It would at least allow time enough for America to force Hanoi to sign an agreement for POWs and exit Vietnam.
How did that work out? You will find out in my next blog….
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I hope you are following along my “primer’ series on a confusing, often misunderstood or misrepresented war. I’m trying to present an overview, a timeline of significant events of the Vietnam War for a better understanding of what happened- Why we got involved, why we fought a war of attrition, and how we defined victory.
I emphasize the background of the Cold War and geopolitical events to point out how they influenced policy to conduct the VN war. After reading these blogs it should be clear the war was often mismanaged through three administrations, two Democratic, one Republican.
My historical novel, RECALL goes into more detail and references. Please look it over. I guarantee you will learn something worthwhile.
Comments invited if civil.
/RLawson
In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVIII – More of the Same
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIX – Nixon’s Early Challenges
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XX – Vietnamization
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXI – Vietnamization Speech Reactions
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXII – Nixon’s Policy in Action
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXIII – Widening the War
The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XXIV – Upping the Ante
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXV – Nixon Landslide
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XXVI- It’s Not Over Yet
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