The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS

Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.

My series continues with LBJ’s ascendency to the Presidency following JFK’s assassination in November 1963. In my last blog I quoted Barbara Tuchman’s characterization of Lyndon B. Johnson, a man with foibles that led to reckless and injudicious decisions. I urge you to read her comments to understand where I’m going with this current blog.

The recurring theme in her documentary is folly. She presents ample examples citing historical parallels from Troy to Vietnam. It seems that folly is a timeless, universal characteristic of imprudence among flawed leaders. In my opinion, many of the decisions LBJ made in the conduct of the Vietnam War personified folly.

Hard decisions loomed in Saigon in 1963/1964. The stakes were rising with the perception that South Vietnam would fall to Communism following Diem’s assassination. Political chaos ruled the day. South Vietnam was coming apart at the seams. Generals vied to take over the Saigon government after the coup. Buddhists protests continued into 1964 following a shocking immolation of a monk in June of ‘63 . Continued ARVN dysfunction in fighting the Viet Cong resulted in the VC taking control of forty percent of South Vietnam. That setback brought the “MacVee” program’s effectiveness into question. Should the U.S. take a command role?

The pressure on the LBJ administration to remedy the circumstances intensified.

The decision makers in DC predicted failure to secure South Vietnam as a Democratic showcase in SE Asia would erode international confidence in the U.S. They claimed American’s image was at stake. Even the NY Times affirmed and supported the administration’s belief in the Domino Theory, the pretext that led to our commitment to make a stand against the threat of monolithic Communism in SE Asia. A lot of hand wringing was going on in the media and DC. North Vietnam was now sending NVR troops south to exploit Saigon’s deterioration. ‘You know what’ was hitting the fan. What should LBJ do?

LBJ dispatched McNamara to Saigon on a fact-finding mission, the classic politician’s bailout strategy when bound with indecision. The Secretary of Defense reported upon his return that if the trend was not reversed, South Vietnam would fall within months. His pronouncement of such a dismal outlook was compounded by exaggerated prophesies of catastrophe. Doom and gloom perceptions served to raise the stakes.

Hysteria has a bad look. Rusk advised LBJ, “Withdrawal would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war”, alluding to Chinese intervention. Rusk, the Secretary of State, added “…to be frustrated in SE Asia would question America’s power.” America would lose “credibility.” His advice reinforced McNamara’s grim prognosis.

That scenario became the LBJ administration’s mindset. LBJ did not want to be the first American President to lose a war, but he lacked the conviction, courage and strategy to win it.

By 1964, ten years had passed since America started propping up the South Vietnamese government following the Geneva conference partitioning Vietnam after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. What did we have to show for it? 

LBJ’s administration vacillated, scrambling for a solution to the deteriorating political and military situation in Vietnam. Trapped, they could not cut and run. But they could not come up with a feasible strategy to make Vietnam go away.

Tuchman makes a cogent point with her question- “Why were the stakes considered so high?” Circumstances had changed following political standoff victories against the Soviet Union during the Cuban and Berlin crises. Why become involved in a war nine thousand miles away in SE Asia? Why deny CIA and military intelligence that a land war in Asia was unwinnable? Why ignore the Korean War and French experience in the region? Why get involved in SE Asia? What was the existential threat? Why continue in a losing proposition?

Was it the Cold War psyche? Concern for Chinese intervention as they did in the Korea War twelve years earlier when the North was losing at the Chosen reservoir? The fear of a nuclear war? Or, other factors political in nature? Maybe… that was the case.

LBJ was facing a November ’64 election pressure from a ‘hawk’, Barry Goldwater, who was bashing Democrats as soft on Communism. LBJ countered, trying to be the peace candidate- “We don’t want our boys doing the fighting for the Asian boys.” No one ever forgot that phrase. It came back to haunt him.

American opinion at the time was divided between hawks and doves. The anti-war protests had not taken hold yet, except on a few college campuses. They escalated to national prominence later in ’65. But the seeds of public dissent were growing when Johnson did not keep the word he pronounced emphatically six months later.

Despite his proclamation, LBJ sent American boys into combat. Marines landed at Danang in March, 1965. I go into the specific details of this military escalation in my historical narrative, RECALL, published last year.

LBJ and his “whiz kids” proceeded to micromanage and mismanage the war effort subsequently, much to the chagrin of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Frustrated Generals and admirals with vast experience in war called for a meeting of minds and to develop a sound strategy. LBJ was planning a bombing campaign of North Vietnam, “Rolling Thunder.” They met in the Oval Office to present their case as recounted by General Charles Cooper, USMC. Not only was their considered advice ignored, but LBJ insulted them with profanities. I urge you to read the account. It will not only shock you, but lend insight into LBJ’s pomposity and arrogance.

Soon afterward, the bombing of North Vietnam commenced and the anti-war protests picked up. This military action began the erosion of LBJ’s credibility. He had a reputation as a habitual liar in the Senate, but often it would go unnoticed or tolerated as part of the political game. But in the spotlight of the Presidency his prevarications came to light. The media started drawing attention to his deceptions. The Office of the Presidency and public faith suffered as a consequence of his exposed duplicity.

LBJ was a cunning schemer. He used the Gulf of Tonkin incident to gain a mandate from Congress to conduct an “executive war” in Vietnam. Some say the incident was staged, a manufactured crisis.

In any case, Congress failed in its responsibility. Basically, Congress’ abrogation of their Article I War powers gave LBJ carte blanche to conduct the Vietnam War. That mistake would lead to dire consequences.

In the prologue of my historical narrative, RECALL, I make the point that the President has the power to conduct a war once it has been declared by Congress. No formal declaration was made in 1964. Give some serious thought how much we should entrust that person with enormous power. War is a zero- sum proposition- You win or lose. Vietnam has some important lessons about the integrity of the nation’s highest office and its inner circle. Right or wrong should be moral absolutes without shades of gray, especially when committing to war and conducting a war.

In my next blogs I will point out LBJ’s administration’s deficiencies and his lack of sound leadership. I will point out how his “limited war” approach failed our military. His policies severely restricted the rules of engagement and led to a war of attrition resulting in excessive casualties.

The outcome of his flawed strategy or lack of a winning strategy could have been predicted. The military and CIA recognized the shortcomings, but their input was largely ignored.

My blogs are intended as an overview, a primer for those with no familiarity of the Vietnam era, not a comprehensive reference. My links fill in the holes dictated by limited words in a blog.

Our population was around 190 million in the sixties. It is 330 million now. That’s a lot of people with little or no knowledge of what happened over there. Those who lived through the era may have little or no recall. That’s why I wrote my historical narrative, RECALL. I hope you will read it.

Comments are welcome, if civil.