The Vietnam war Revisited- Part XVII – LBJ Out, Nixon In

Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.

To see all of the posts in this series, please scroll to the bottom of this post.

In a nationally televised address attempting to quell growing public dissent by explaining his administration’s failed efforts at negotiating “peace” with North Vietnam, LBJ shocked the world by announcing he would not run for reelection in November, 1968.

Frustrated and reading the handwriting on the wall after losing the New Hampshire primary, LBJ bailed out of the Democratic primary in Wisconsin, scheduled for the second of April, 1968. He did not want to risk adding the humiliation of losing the nomination to McCarthy or RFK to the dishonor of being “the first American President to lose a war.” His bombshell proclamation fractured the Democratic party. Nixon took advantage of his political dilemma creating another firestorm. But, that’s another story for another blog.

LBJ had only seven months to turn the war around before the November election. Hoping to salvage some semblance of success for his legacy, he took a different tack, trying to ride both sides of the seesaw- simultaneously intensifying bombing while accelerating attempts at negotiations in Paris and through backchannels with Kissinger. How’d that turn out?

Heavy bombing resumed and increased along the DMZ, but spared North Vietnam above the DMZ, again without his desired result. And, although North Vietnam would ‘talk’ in Paris accords, they would not negotiate, demanding unacceptable, unconditional preconditions. Thus, both efforts turned out to be dead ends.

Consequently, 1968 became a disastrous year with escalating political chaos at home, and increasing fatalities abroad in the Tet battles raging in South Vietnam.

That both of LBJ’s last ditch efforts failed should not be surprising outcomes because Ho Chi Minh was also reading the handwriting on the wall.

Interpreting a different message and sequel, Ho remained resigned to ride it out, not negotiate. Instead, in a striking departure from guerilla warfare, he decided to roll the dice by launching an all-out 85,000 NVR invasion of South Vietnam. Ho planned to fight with the Viet Cong to the last man during Tet, the Chinese New Year. Committed, Ho would accept a 50% casualty rate to force America give up their war efforts, convincing them to leave South Vietnam. He hoped the South Vietnamese would revolt and join their fight. That never happened and he was defeated over a long, bitter year during which widespread North Vietnamese terrorism occurred, but went under reported.

During 1968, LBJ’s last year in office, over 4,000 Americans were killed during the year-long Tet offensive. Not a single South Vietnam major city was lost. The fighting in Hue was door to door. Despite 58,000 of the enemy KIA by the end of the ’68 Tet battles, our military victories became political losses. Think about that fact. To put it into perspective, the enemy suffered as many KIA in one year as we eventually would in ten.

McNamara’s “body counts” probably were undercounted as the enemy collected many of their fatally wounded. Some estimates went as high as 200,000 KIA when the VC were included in the casualty statistics.

Nevertheless, two hundred American dying in combat every week became more than the public could tolerate, especially with the media’s daily bombardment of “bad news.” Photojournalism had the greatest impact showing graphic wartime depictions that influenced public opinion negatively. One picture was indeed worth a thousand words.

The exonerating backstories were often omitted, otherwise anti-war bias might have been moderated. The fourth estate often went “MIA”, failing to accurately report the news. Bias feedback factor exacerbated public discourse and fanned the anarchic fire of the radicals.

Since the beginning of American intervention in Vietnam in 1961, over 16,500 troops had been KIA up to 1968, not a widely known fact. Most of our fatalities occurred from 1968 on. In contrast, only 400 were KIA during the Expeditionary Force period,1961 to ’64, the early “advisory era of MAAG/MACV. However, the widely publicized, concurrent media reports of ‘68 Tet casualty statistics dramatically escalated the anti-war furor in the States. Political camps became polarized carrying confronting protest signs that read: “Hey, hey, LBJ…How many kids did you kill today?” vs “Love it or leave it, Commie!”

The protests became violent on campuses and in the streets. Vandalism and riots evolved into anarchy. I lived through that era in SF. You had to see it to believe it, civil American society unraveling. It was mindboggling.

As noted in my previous blog, America was coming apart at the seams. LBJ was done…

The furtive betrayal that the LBJ administration telegraphed the next day’s bombing targets in North Vietnam via Swiss Embassies remained classified and buried, or he might have been impeached. Our Air Force suspected the perfidy. Pilots complained to command that the enemy had their Wild Weasel call signs and found their targets heavily fortified upon arrival and MiG’s in the air. North Vietnamese Intelligence was not that good. Someone had to be tipping them off. But their complaints fell on deaf ears in DC where LBJ insisted everyone remain “on the team.”

Colonel Robin Olds took matters in his own hands with a clever deception, Operation Bolo, taking out half of North Vietnam’s Mig-21’s. You might want to Google that episode.

In January 1969 Nixon and Kissinger assumed command, asserting they “would end this one and win the peace.” They did not say how, but stated that they did not want to upset LBJ’s peace negotiations in Paris, inferring they had a plan.

They inherited a bad situation. Nixon professed his intentions to end the war through negotiations, but like LBJ, did not want to be tagged with the moniker of “first American President to lose a war.” He figured he had six months before Vietnam would become his war. What were his options? Unilaterally withdraw or release the “Dogs of War?”

I plan to address those challenging issues in my next blog. Did Nixon participate in the folly? Tuchman insists he did. I differ in some respects which I will clarify in Blog XVIII.

For those who may be unfamiliar or confused with the major Vietnam War timelines up to this point, let me briefly outline them: 

• JFK introduced military advisors in ’61- MAAG.
• Later, in 1962, it became MACV. “MacVee,” allowed U.S. command to co-op field operations not possible under MAAG. MACV found AVRN ineffective.
• 1963- South Vietnam President Diem was killed in a coup d’etat followed by JFK’s assassination later in ’63. The CIA was implicated in the overthrow of the Diem government. LBJ became President.
• 1965- Marines land in Danang authorized search and destroy missions. Vietnam becomes America’s war. LBJ escalates war by calling up reserves increasing troop commitment reaching close to 550,000 during Tet offensive in 1968.
• LBJ did not seek reelection in November ’68. Democrats lose election.
• In 1969, Nixon becomes President. My next blog will pick up from there.

Note: The Vietnam War era was officially designated 1964 to ’75. Before that, our MACV/MAAG troops were considered Expeditionary Forces. Actually, for all intents and purposes, we became involved in the war in 1961 despite the designation. We suffered about 400 KIA during that three year “advisory” period.  Nixon withdrew our combat forces in ’73, but it took two years before we were out of Vietnam in 1975, often not under the most auspicious circumstances…CIA, diplomats, and Vietnamese allies were evacuated from rooftops by helicopters, but most Vietnamese collaborators by flotilla of boats of all sizes and description.  By that time,1975, our war casualties numbered 58,220. Their names are commemorated on The Wall in DC.

Comments welcomed if civil. The Vietnam War raises contentious issues, I understand. But if we do not learn the lessons of history, we’re condemned to repeat them to paraphrase Santayana. Join the discussion. We can learn from each other.