The Vietnam War Revisited- Part XV – No Way Out

Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.

Previous blogs discussed LBJ’s failed efforts to get the North Vietnamese to capitulate following Operation Rolling Thunder’s graduated bombing of targets in North Vietnam. Why did they fail?

 Our 7^th Air Force pilots flying Wild Weasel missions quickly noted many vital targets were off-limits. They complained to command they were bombing the wrong targets, nonessential objectives unlikely to discourage or defeat the enemy. Why take the great risks for poor results? They were correct.

But, LBJ’s whiz kids were calling the shots, not “Wild Weasel” command, not MACV, not CINCPAC, not the Chiefs of Staff.

LBJ’s administration, government civilians in DC, not experienced military professionals in the field, were conducting the selection of targets, gradually ratcheting up the order of “importance,” i.e. those considered politically expedient, most likely to bring the enemy to the negotiating table in their estimation.

However, incremental bombing efforts were not getting the job done. The North Vietnamese were intransient – Resolute on attaining their goal of uniting Vietnam under Ho’s version of Communism. Basically, LBJ’s administration did not ‘understand the enemy,’ the ageless fundamental of war. The North Vietnamese were familiar with Sun Tzu’s art of war- They understood the enemy, us, and themselves.

The military’s frustration did not stop there. Our ground troops out on search and destroy missions were forbidden to pursue the enemy escaping “across the fence” into Laos and Cambodia where the VC and NVR regrouped and reloaded in safe havens. Self-imposed restrictions of this magnitude were not conducive to winning a war, another example of LBJ’s ill-conceived policy or lack of a sound strategy to win the war. From day one, he sought a way out ‘not to lose the war.’ The commitment to win was too politically costly. LBJ continued JFK’s “limited war” strategy, assuming our military superiority would prevail against an enemy he greatly underestimated and did not respect.

Ignoring the military’s professional targeting advice hampered the war effort consequently. The military viewed the administration’s restrictions as unrealistic. The selected targets were not critical to cripple the enemy, much less convince them to come to LBJ’s negotiation terms. The pretext and objective of the sustained bombing campaign failed on both accounts.

Military morale suffered and exasperation evolved as our casualties mounted (KIA, MIA, POW.) Our planes would encounter heavily fortified targets upon arrival, and the pilots started to suspect the enemy had foreknowledge of their mission. In fact, they enemy did in some cases. It was not coincidence.

LBJ was conducting a war of attrition at our Air Force’s expense. Through the Swiss Embassies in DC and Hanoi, the administration tipped off the next day’s targets in an ill-conceived effort to control North Vietnamese collateral damage. This action actually amounted to aiding and abetting the enemy in my opinion. This perfidy is a little-known fact exposed by New Zealand war correspondent, Peter Arnett in a 1980 Canadian documentary.

I doubt very few Americans are aware of this shocking disclosure. But, many surviving Vietnam pilots are quite cognizant of the shameful fact, I guarantee you.

In my historical narrative, RECALL, I question why the ‘relaying the targeting’ betrayal was not considered treason by LBJ, Rusk, And McNamara? What do you think? There was no real accountability for their insidious action. Why? Where was the fourth estate? How did information remain buried for so long?

By 1967 it became quite clear that the Rolling Thunder pilots were often designated to bomb targets of little or no consequence at great risk of being shot down. LBJ’s administration’s expectations were unrealistic if essential airfields, harbors, petroleum reserves, hydroelectric plants and dams were not at the top of the list, the pilots justifiably complained. The bombing was intended to bring the enemy to the table. That would never happen with LBJ’s flawed strategy of graduated bombing and micromanagement of the war.

In addition, multiple administration ‘behind-the-scenes’ attempts in 1967/68 to get Hanoi to negotiate a face-saving end to the war failed because each warring party demanded unyielding preconditions that precluded any peaceful settlement, much less coming to the table. Neither side would give in, concede anything. The bombing only increased the enemy’s resolve, much like the London bombings by the Germans did in WWII.

Hanoi bet our resolve would falter before theirs due to our cost in lives or treasure, or rising public dissent in the U.S. They knew the war was becoming a source of dispute and controversy in the States. In retrospect, they possessed prescience in their wager. They were aware that America had no patience for long wars. Cognizant the media was fanning the anti-war protests. They were in it for the long run to the last man.

Vietnam had over a millenia of history of perseverance and prevailing in wars with the Chinese, Japanese, and French. They dug in for the long haul. We failed to recognize their resilience or Ho’s resolve to unite Vietnam under his form of Communism. We were committed to nation building, making South Vietnam a showplace of Democracy. We were hellbent on defeating monolithic Communism based on the prevalent Cold War theory of the era- The Domino Theory. Ho Chi Minh had a less complex goal and pursued it relentlessly.

In 1967, 9,000 Americans were killed, 60,000 wounded. For perspective, that’s almost twice our losses in the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Those statistics astounded the public. Consequently, the anti-war sentiment increased with protests and riots, Draft card burning, dodging, and escape to Canada became acts of defiance. The media fanned the heated dissent. Hardhats blamed the hippies, civility floundered, and the divisiveness amplified as America chose camps- Patriots or anti-war sympathizers, doves or hawks… Photojournalism flourished and influenced public opinion, as did ‘fake news.’ America became polarized.

Senator Fulbright’s ’67 contentious debates in Congress did not dissuade support of the Vietnam War, one that the Congress never declared, but funded.  Only two Senators voted against appropriation bills. America was becoming deeply driven apart. The political camps’ discontent would escalate into ugly divisions by the next year, 1968, at the height of the war.

It was becoming clear to LBJ that there was no way the Vietnam entanglement would end to his advantage. Rolling Thunder was not bringing Ho Chi Minh to the table to negotiate a face-saving end to the war. LBJ had eighteen months to election in ’68. The military could not win the war within that time frame. And, with an election looming, he could not disengage and afford to lose Vietnam. That would be political suicide.

That was LBJ’s conundrum threatening to destroy his Presidency. He would have to face the protests, the increasing number of casualties, the draftees’ revolt, the calling up of the Reserves, plus the growing resentment of the military at the administration’s restraints holding them back. Not happy prospects. The mood was grim.

The Generals and Admirals who fought a war of attrition in Korea did not want another similar experience of self-imposed restrictions deterring a potential military victory and were speaking out to a President who demanded everyone remain, “On the team,” arrogantly claiming that he, “knew more than the Generals” and “They can’t bomb an outhouse without my approval.”

Essentially, there was no way out for LBJ. The next blog will address the outcome of his decision to stay the course. It won’t be pretty… Self-imposed restrictions on the Rules of Engagement usually do not attain the intended outcomes.

Comments welcomed, if civil. The blogs are intended to be educational, not relitigate the controversial issues the Vietnam War engendered. But I may be kidding myself – Vietnam remains controversial over fifty years later. I welcome your opinions nevertheless.

If you really have a deep interest in the history of the war and divisive aftermath, read my historical narrative, RECALL.

/ RLawson