Barbara Tuchman’s analysis of the Vietnam War in her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam is the inspiration behind this series of posts. All of the previous posts in the series can be found at the bottom of this post.
In case you missed any of the previous blogs, here they are:
The Vietnam War Revisited
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part II – It Did Not Have to Be That Way
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part III – Misgovernment
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IV – Was It Worth It?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part V – What If’s
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VI – Ignoring Expert Advice
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VII -A War of Attrition
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part IX – JFK’s Dilemma
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part X – No Easy Answers
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XI – Two Earthshaking Events
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XII – Why Revisit?
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIII – LBJ Becomes POTUS
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XIV – It Starts Hitting the Fan|
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XV – No Way Out
The Vietnam War Revisited – Part XVI – Coming Apart at the Seams
In my last blog I recounted JFK’s Vietnam dilemma in 1962 – How to get out of Vietnam without jeopardizing his chances of re-election one and a half years away? His options were limited to “fish or cut bait.”
Buoyed by his confrontational victory over USSR’s Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis, his administration’s prestige and confidence soared. JFK looked for ways out of U.S. involvement in a war he viewed not in the nation’s vital interest, but he was trapped. Disengagement would cause a domestic uproar. The Republicans would have a heyday branding him as weak on Communism. He waffled looking for feasible policy changes, but vacillation carried the day. There were no easy answers.
Tuchman points out the missed opportunity- “With the blow to Communism in Cuba and enhanced American prestige, it would have been a moment to disengage from Vietnam with every hope of overriding a domestic uproar.”
But as I’ve recapped in my previous blogs, this was an era when the Cold War mindset prevailed. That psyche fostered the Domino Theory, the predicate for becoming militarily involved in South Vietnam.
A constant worry for JFK’s administration lingered- the fear of what China may do. The Sino-Soviet split led to Russian détente, but the Chinese menace persisted, reinforcing the threat envisioned in the Domino theory. That perception added to JFK’s conundrum. Indeed, it basically defined ‘being in a box.’
Unfortunately, JFK and the “best and brightest” of his inner circle did not understand the most important fundamental in any adversary relationship, “Know your enemy.”
Not a “shining moment” for Camelot. The administration failed in their assessment of the Chinese. They overestimated the risk of China’s interest in massive involvement in Vietnam while underestimating the Vietnamese resolve not to let them fight their war. Accept their supplies and technology maybe, but not their troops. Ho intended to sort it out himself using the insurgent VC forces in the South.
China’s “great leap forward” landed the country in an economic ditch. Certainly not in a position to pursue a foreign adventure in Vietnam. Tuchman makes a cogent point I failed to see so succinctly stated in my five years of research of Vietnam war documentaries. I quote her verbatim – “If Americans could have seen the value of accepting a strongly nationalistic North Vietnam, Communist or not, a vigorous, independent, intensely anti-Chinese nation would have been a far better barrier against the feared Chinese expansion than a warring country offering every opportunity for interference from across the border.”
Take a moment to ponder that profound statement.
Recall in a previous blog I pointed out that Ho Chi Minh’s offer to unite North and South Vietnam following the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, 1954 was turned down because he was Communist? That demonstrates how strong Cold War mindsets and sentiments influenced policy decisions in that era. Communism was a very bad word.
Meanwhile, MACV and CINCPAC were drawing up plans for financing and building up AVRN’s training capabilities so that by the end of 1963 South Vietnam could be expected to take over the war. That was the game plan JFK pinned his hopes on to bail out of Vietnam after his re-election. Good intentions may pave the path to Hell, the old saying goes.
But in 1963 two seminal events occurred that shook the world and changed the entire course of the war. Stand by, my next blog will address them in detail.
If you have missed any of these blogs, they are intended to be educational, a primer for those who were not alive in the Sixties or have no RECALL of the Vietnam War.
Comments are welcome if civil.
We need to learn the lessons of that war or be condemned to repeat the mistakes (Santayana paraphrased).
I hope you take the time to read my narrative history, RECALL. You will find more facts in the book that blog space does not allow for in a more comprehensive review.
With 20/20 hindsight, so obvious! The disheartening thing is that I don’t think our leaders have learned much. 18 years In Afghanistan, we’re negotiating with the Taliban and they’re still killing civilians.