The Vietnam War Revisited- Part VIII – Backing a Losing Horse?

In my last blog I discussed JFK’s decision to become involved militarily in South Vietnam in 1961. With attribution to noted historian, Barbara Tuchman and my historical narrative, RECALL, I pointed out the two traps his administration fell into- Quests to defeat the Soviet proclamation and support for “wars of liberation” in Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam. And, the decision to enjoin the fight against monolithic Communism, the pretext for U.S. commitment in what many considered a civil war at that time in Vietnam.

JFK bought into the prevailing Cold War dogma professed by Truman and Eisenhower. His administration decided to make a stand in Vietnam to prevent communism’s spread throughout SE Asia, the Domino Theory. They intended to make Vietnam a showcase for Democracy in Indochina. Noble causes perhaps, but not grounded in CIA and Military assessments that contraindicated our military involvement. Why did we think it would be different for us than the French experience?  Why get entangled in a guerilla war in hostile terrain against a foe well trained in hit and run tactics?

In my prior “Revisited” blogs, I outlined how JFK’s administration ignored the other significant realities on the ground in South Vietnam – Vietnamese independence, nationalism, disdain for Diem’s corrupt government, and the struggle of day-to-day for survival for many. The Buddhists were persecuted and some died in immolation protests and South Vietnam lacked a stable government enjoying wide public support. Diem was a political animal. He appeared more worried about a coup than North Vietnamese imposing Communism in the South employing the VC as a proxy insurgent force.

Few Vietnamese had an intellectual interest in the mission America hoped for. It was not an academic exercise for the man in the streets of Saigon or the peasant in his or her rice paddy. Winning their “hearts and minds” would become a pipe dream and a constant source of frustration during the war due to misguided policies. Relocation projects often failed. Liberating a village from the VC made little sense if it was not secured long term. The countryside peasant was caught in the middle and suffered collateral damage during the conflict.

Long before 1961, OSS/CIA operatives led by Lansdale and Conein propped up Diem’s Government. They funneled U.S. government funds supporting the ARVN against the insurgent Viet Cong in the fifties and early sixties. This was an easy transition since they had already supported the anti-communist efforts in Laos next door for over a decade.

How many know the U.S. underwrote much of the French war effort towards the end of that “colonial war” in 1954? Do you think the Vietnamese failed to note our involvement? Building faith in Diem’s government became a long shot gamble. Funding it proved foolhardy. Committing American troops – arguably a folly.

On the military advisory front in South Vietnam, “The situation gets worse, almost week by week…The guerillas control almost all of the Mekong Delta…” war correspondent Theodore White informed the White House.

The basic problem- Our MAAG advisors could not co-op the missions and found the ARVN lacking in discipline and initiative in 1961. Colonel John Vann was almost relieved of his command after his candid after action report (AAR) following the Ap Bac debacle in the Mekong Delta. I recount this battle in my historical narrative, RECALL. General Harkins liked to dress up the truth. At this time, MAAG chief, General McGarr estimated that Diem’s troops controlled only 40% of South Vietnam. The VC were winning. JFK was in a box.

The circumstances were so gloomy the Secretary Dean Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. may be backing “a losing horse.” An honest admission despite his commitment to fighting Communism.

Tuchman observed JFK’s instinct in 1961 was “caution, subject to ambivalence.” JFK urged Diem to “galvanize and supplement” Vietnamese effort, for which “no amount of extra aid can substitute.” The option of American combat troops was held in abeyance.

How did that work out? Later, in February 1962, full field command (MACV) superseded MAAG. “Mac-Vee” many consider was the beginning of the Vietnam War. By mid-1962 American forces numbered 8,000 and by the end of the year, over 11,000. Ten months later, 17,000 were serving along with ARVN units at every level from battalion to general staff. We were in, big time.

I quote Tuchman’s cogent observation of this development- “This was war by the executive, without Congressional authorization… war virtually without public knowledge, though not without notice.”

The RNC challenged JFK’s evasions and denials, accusing him of being “less than candid with the American people, urging him to “drop the pretense about ‘advisors.’”  Kennedy hedged, “We have not sent our combat troops there- in the general sense of the word. We have increased our training mission and our logistic report…to meet our security needs in the area.”

We were in South Vietnam for the long haul for better or worse ostensibly to fight Communism and prevent the “Domino Theory” from becoming a reality. To any reasonable observer, we had a ‘dog in that fight’ despite denials to the contrary.

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If you want a ‘deep dive’ into the war and its aftermath, read my historical narrative, RECALL. The story relates the wartime experiences of four pals who played on their high school football team in the Fifties and end up in Vietnam a decade later in different capacities. If you are a Vet, I think you will identify with their stories, it could have been yours. I think you will not only enjoy the read, but also learn more about that contentious era.

Why do I take the time and effort to write about such a controversial subject? Mainly as a primer for those who know little about that war. Most of us who served in country will soon be gone. It’s my obligation to pass on what I have learned so later generations will not repeat our mistakes. Half our population was not born back in the sixties. Ignorance is not bliss.

/ RLawson