– Operation “Rolling Thunder” –
Why keep writing blogs about a war from over fifty years ago? Because my generation owes it to the current generation to pass on what we learned, or failed to learn in order to not to repeat the same mistakes. Half of our population was not even born then, and many others who were alive fail to RECALL accurate details of the Vietnam War. I guarantee you Vietnam vets have not forgotten. Believe me, as a nation we need to learn the lessons history offers or we are destined to repeat them at a great cost in military lives.
I present the background of this critical North Vietnam bombing campaign called “Rolling Thunder” as viewed by Captain Roe MacDonald, the protagonist flight surgeon in my novel, RECALL. The excerpts below are of his conversations with Biff Roberts, CIA deputy station manager in Saigon, another pivotal character in the fictional historical narrative. While the characters are fictional, the factual data is not. These excerpts will give the reader a glimpse of how that aspect of the war was managed, or mismanaged depending on your perception or bias. You decide. I challenge you.
Excerpt One:
“As a matter of fact, I’m flying to Bangkok tonight after our dinner. Got some jump orders with a C- 135 crew outta Tan Son Nhut. I plan a little R& R with my Aussie sweetheart, Lynne. After that I have some consultations and flight physicals up at our airbase up in Takhli, Thailand. The flight surgeon up there is swamped with the buildup of the fighter bomber squadrons at 355th TAC Fighter Wing.”
“Sounds like fun. What have we got up at Takhli?” Biff knew the answer, it was a rhetorical question.
“Supersonic F- 105 THUDs, and the newer version two seat F- 105G fighter bomber. They are conducting some intensive North Vietnam bombing missions out of Thailand. Unfortunately, they’re taking some big- time losses from NVN antiaircraft, SAMs, and MiGs.”
“Operation Wild Weasel, Roe? Or Rolling Thunder?”
“That’s classified information, Biff, but you’re cleared top secret, so I guess we can discuss it. It has some important implications for the conduct of the war, a topic you can discuss in your CINCPAC intel meetings in Hawaii.”
Roe suspected the CIA was aware of every detail of the escalating bombing plans on the drawing board for North Vietnam airstrikes, including the six zone NVN attack plan dictated by CINCPAC and MACV. He knew Biff was just messing with him.
“I’ve got my sources,” Biff grinned and chuckled. “I didn’t know until recently how powerful a fighter bomber the F- 105 really is. Has a bomb bay big enough to carry an atomic bomb. F- 105s can pack more wallop than a WWII B- 17 or B- 24 with conventional bombs.”
“You’re very knowledgeable, Biff. You never cease to amaze me with the scope of your technical detail. Add this vital information to your data bank. It will blow you away. The NVN targets are selected, not by the JCS military experts based on actionable intel like the CIA’s, but by LBJ’s inner circle, who don’t know jack shit.”
“I suspected as much.”
“Here’s the skinny. NVN prime targets are heavily fortified with SAMs, Zu- 33 anti- aircraft, and MiGs. Consequently, the F- 4 target suppression aircraft and our F- 105 bombers are taking heavy losses. Pilots complain it’s almost like NVN knows their targets ahead of time, even know their call signs and ETA. They suspect something is fishy since NVN intel is definitely not that good. Over the last two years, the Navy has lost 160 planes, and the USAF 280. Planes can be replaced, but not the 300 pilots who ejected and ended up POWs or MIA. This has the potential to inflict psychological damage on our fighter command and defeat the mission. The pilots complain they take high risks to bomb marginally significant targets, while critical targets nearby and easily accessible are restricted, designated as off limits for political reasons.”
He shook his head in disgust and took a sip of his G and T. Biff could see Roe was very upset about this situation.
“Naturally this BS pisses off TAC wing commanders and their pilots. Flyers at Danang, carrier squadrons in Yankee Station, and those at eleven other airbases have registered similar complaints to Takhli’s 355th TAC Wing, which has suffered the major brunt of our losses. This DC nonsense seriously affects morale. No one can understand why politicians are picking the targets, not the JCS. They wonder why there are so many self- imposed restrictions on those critical targets so obvious to them and easily accessible to their ordinance. They question why we don’t inflict a real impact on the enemy and get this war over. They want to go all out, since they realize they have the capability to cripple the enemy.”
Roe leaned back and looked Biff in the eye. “Their frustration keeps flight surgeons busy accessing if the air crews are still fit psychologically to fly, or won’t go rogue in a fit of anger when their wingman is shot down. That’s the situation I have to deal with at Takhli Royal Thai Airbase. The 3555th TAC wing has been hit the hardest. It’s starting to get to them. Their flight surgeons are swamped with depressed, frustrated, and angry pilots’ complaints.”
“Didn’t know those stats, Roe. A big morale problem could compromise their mission, I agree. Can’t keep sustaining those losses very much longer. Sounds like the frustration is building to the boiling point.”
“That’s the big picture DC doesn’t get, Biff. If the pilots are taking that much risk, why not make it worthwhile by targeting vital installations? Hit ’em where it hurts. More of a risk/reward equation. This strategy is counter-productive to winning a war.”
“I like the way you think, Roe. LBJ and his boys think they know more than the generals and admirals. That’s the basic problem, as I see it. We’ll discuss the problem at our next CINCPAC intel meeting. Register our complaint through channels. Maybe they’ll get it. Thanks for your input, pal.”
Excerpt Two:
The short stint at Takhli Royal Thai Air Base following his Bangkok breather had been an eye opener. He spent three days with 355th TAC combat flight crews, and their squadron and wing commanders. He agreed with the resident Thailand flight surgeons that operation “Rolling Thunder” was taking an emotional toll on the combat pilots, as well as physical.
Roe learned these bomb runs into NVN’s dangerous Route Pack Alpha 6 sector had already approached a thousand sorties. He also saw that the staging of huge numbers of planes and armaments at three airbases in northern Thailand foretold the war’s escalation in future operations. It also indicated to him that the war would soon move to another level of intensity with increased U.S. involvement.
The buildup of supersonic F-105 fighter- bomber squadrons, “Thuds,” posed an ominous threat to North Vietnam, Unfortunately, it also cost a huge unforeseen expense not factored in on the drawing boards. The strike forces were incurring terrific losses of aircraft and flight crews from NVN anti- aircraft, SAMs, and MiG intercepts on their NVN missions. The planes carried RHAW homing and warning systems to detect enemy radar, and employed electronic warfare radar jamming, known as “music” in flyer jargon. Despite these additional electronic counter measures (ECM), and target suppression by Udorn, Thailand and Navy F- 4s flying off carriers in Yankee Station in the North China Sea, the Thuds took a significant amount of enemy fire.
The F- 105s were often crippled, forcing pilot ejections. Under the best circumstances, the combat pilots could fly the damaged plane out of the Alpha 6 sector, punch out, and parachute northwest of the Red River in northern Laos or South Vietnam. This gave them a chance of survival when picked up by “Jolly Greens” rescue choppers. Otherwise, pilots risked capture and brutal treatment as a POWs, or being listed as MIA or KIA. Their efforts were complicated by distance- to- target logistics dictating aerial refueling from KC- 135s on the way back to base. Loaded with heavy bombs en route to NVN, the F- 105s could not carry enough JP- 4 to make the round- trip return to base (RTB). The daily, long, perilous sorties were stressful. Flying NVN combat missions east of the Red River to attack targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong harbor sector required considerable skill and nerve, aka “cojones.”
Fighter pilots are a tough, special breed willing to take great risks if the reward justifies the action, but increasing losses of comrades took an emotional impact. Mounting aircrew and aircraft losses, plus the fact CINCPAC placed vital targets off-limits, affected Wing morale. They soon recognized the risk/reward equation in Alpha 6 was not tilted in their favor. In fact, it was out of whack.
Squadrons questioned wing commanders why they bombed non- critical NVN targets at such great risk when vital targets were ripe for the picking? Every day, they saw essential infrastructure on their multiple air strikes, assessed their vulnerability, and knew they could take them out.
Why place the MiG airbases at Hoa Luc, Gia Lam, Kep, and Phuc off-limits? Why not bomb NVN steel mills, power plants, rail- head and lines, SAM sites, and harbor facilities? Strike vital targets to cripple the enemy? Bomb the hydroelectric plants and dams on the Chinese borders flooding much of NVN? They tried to figure out why they were prevented from doing so. What was so apparent to them clearly eluded the decision makers. Something definitely was not right. The self- imposed restrictions made no sense, a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot disconnect.
The TAC pilots soon figured out CINCPAC took orders from Washington DC regarding the targets. Word was out that LBJ’s inner
circle often ignored the JCS and the CIA’s input. This deplorable situation and the lack of a comprehensive strategy to win the war appalled them. Frustration would only continue to build and their stress mount under these restrictive rules of engagement.
Flight surgeons had to address these stress factors when determining if the pilot was fit to fly, capable of making the right decision under fire without going rogue or freaking out. Roe held long conversations with them. Their resilience impressed him—despite the obstacles, the fighter jocks persevered and carried out their missions professionally.
Some pilots planned to address the threat factor in Alpha 6 sector. He’d heard a story from a reliable source that Colonel Robin Olds, stationed at Udorn AB, Thailand, devised a clever plan to intercept MiG- 21s harassing the “Thuds” on their North Vietnam bomb runs. Hanoi SIGINT had learned the predictable identifying factors, or ID, of incoming F- 105 flight patterns, including their call signs and radio frequencies. Olds set a trap, “Operation Bolo.” He assembled a squadron of nimble F- 4s, superior in air- to- air combat to the F- 105. His squadron posed as F- 105s using their ID en route to North Vietnam.
He pulled off the masquerade using Thud ID to take down MiGs expecting a sortie of F- 105s, rather than these nimble F- 4 aerial aces.
Olds went on to become a three- time ace—sixteen kills in two wars—and USAF awarded him a Flying Cross. And, they promoted him to general, every Wing commanders’ dream.
“Operation Bolo” became one of many famous Vietnam war stories illustrating American military commanders’ ingenuity in excelling in their mission despite D.C. mismanagement restricting their rules of engagement. That’s one lesson learned, take note.
These excerpts also give you a firsthand viewpoint of the frustration our pilots faced, and the toil it took- Loss of 440 USAF/ Navy aircraft over two years of bombing what many pilots considered inconsequential targets. Planes can be replaced , but not the pilots KIA, or the 300 who ended up as MIA or POWs. Think about that a moment.
Want to read more? You will find more stories like this one in my recently published fictional historical narrative, RECALL.
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