Vietnam War and The Domino Theory
How well do you understand the Domino Theory? Do you know the background? Half our population was not born in the sixties, so I doubt they have any idea why it was the pretext for our involvement in a SE Asian war lasting from 1961 to 1975. Others may have no RECALL.
Here is how the theory’s concept is generally defined – If South Vietnam falls to North Vietnam’s communist proxy, the Viet Cong, the other contiguous SE Asian countries would topple like dominoes.
Eisenhower coined the term in 1955 at the height of the Cold War with China and Russia. JFK bought into the concept of the monolithic threat and introduced military advisors in ’61 to contain the spread of communism. Three years later, LBJ escalated the war – as I have written about here and here.
How well did the theory stand up?
Laos fell to the Pathet Lao, Cambodia fell to Khmer Rouge, but not the other countries. This topic is the subject of debate. The complexity is discussed in my historical narrative, RECALL, and excerpted below.
EXCERPT FROM RECALL
“What most people would like to forget are the unintended consequences of our withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Over the next two years, after we pulled out, hundreds of thousands died, mostly in Cambodia at the hands of the vicious Khmer Rouge. Many Vietnamese who failed to escape, also perished. That’s it in a nutshell. A capsule summary of a mismanaged, illogical war that we’ll be discussing for years to come,” Ann concluded.
Biff had listened intently. He loved Ann’s systematic analysis. “What about the Domino Theory? What’s your final impression?”
“Good point, it seems to me it might have been a flawed concept.”
“How’s that?’ Biff pressed.
“My three key observations are: First, South Vietnam didn’t start to fall until 1973, four years after the Nixon Doctrine put the war back in the hands of the Vietnamese. That doesn’t fit the theory. Southeast Asia didn’t collapse either after we left Vietnam. Second, the war in Laos lasted twice as long and ended in a coalition government. No domino effect happened there. Not to discount the tragedy, but Cambodia’s genocide by the Khmer Rouge hardly fits the Domino Theory. Third, all the other SEATO countries remained intact after South Vietnam fell into communist hands.”
Biff pursed his lips in thought. “How do you explain that? Shouldn’t we totally disregard the Domino Theory? When Vietnam fell, all of Southeast Asia did not topple like dominoes as predicted as you pointed out.”
“It’s not that simple, Biff,” Ann quickly countered. “That proposition takes out of consideration several major world events occurring in the ten- year interval between 1965 and 1975 that greatly influenced the outcome in Indochina. It could be argued that our involvement in Vietnam bought time for the world to transform in a positive direction geopolitically, all changes favoring U.S. interests.”
“Interesting concept. Please elaborate on that.”
“My thinking is influenced by two prominent historians: Mark Moyar and H. R. McMaster. I essentially agree with their assessment. It’s not revisionist history. It’s good deductive reasoning on their part, in my view.”
“So, what is your interpretation of the situation and the events?”
“The key argument against the Domino Theory is that the Eisenhower and JFK administrations were wrong in their basic assumption. The contrarians maintain that the dominoes were not in danger of toppling in the early 1960s because the dominoes didn’t fall in 1975 when the South Vietnamese government fell to the communists of North Vietnam. But, this may be fuzzy thinking on their part … Despite flawed policies, the U.S. attained its objective of containing communism’s spread in Southeast Asia with its intervention in Vietnam, not so much by the effectiveness of our policies, but mostly by buying important time for other significant changes to occur elsewhere. These interval changes significantly influenced the outcome in Southeast Asia’s containment of communism.”
“Interesting point. Any pertinent examples?” Biff asked politely, knowing Ann never made claims she could not back up.
“Several, in fact. One of the most important events was the cultural Chinese revolution diminishing China’s threat to the region. The overthrow of Sukarno in Indonesia represented another contributing factor. Third, Britain prevailed in its Malaysian conflict, another key factor in thwarting communism’s spread in Southeast Asia.”
“Convincing argument.” Biff conceded. Biff reflected on her valuable contributions to their joint intelligence conferences years ago. She hasn’t lost a step, still sharp as a tack!
Ann smiled. In her element, she enjoyed every minute of the intellectual stimulus and debate over a contentious topic.
Ann continued with zest. “The Sino- Soviet rift was very material in modifying the Russian and Chinese outlook on Southeast Asia. Another important influence was Nixon’s détente with USSR and China. All of these represent seminal historic events impacting the outcome in the region.
She asked if they recalled how the wars in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia went on for over ten years without affecting Thailand, Singapore, the Philippine Islands and other major SEATO nations’ democratic forms of government. After that long period of war, the Southeast Asian countries were certainly more capable of protecting themselves from the spread of communism. More importantly, they possessed the commitment and determination, as well as the will power to do so. On the other side, by 1975 China and the Soviets were disinclined to pursue their original goal of the early sixties, which was communist domination in Southeast Asia. Times change, perspectives and objectives change. Simple as that, Biff.”
“That’s a good way to look at it. Very compelling, hard to argue against your comprehensive overview. Great summation.”
Want to read RECALL? You can purchase it on Amazon in Kindle format or paperback.
Want to hear what others are saying? Read RECALL’s reviews
Leave a Reply